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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee concedes that the jurisdictional statement set forth by Appellant 
Weinstein is correct. The Supreme Court has deferred jurisdiction to the Court of 
Appeals. 
Throughout this brief the Appellant is referred to as the "neighbor" or 
"Weinstein" and the Appellants are referred to as the "property owners" or the "Popiels," 
consistent with Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
It is difficult to identify the issues Weinstein raises on appeal because they are 
confusing. 
ISSUE 1(a). Weinstein urges that the district court erred in declining to grant 
his cross motion for summary judgment on the undisputed facts. He then revisits 
excerpts of selected facts which he believes to be favorable to him throughout his 
Statement of the Case, but fails to marshal the evidence. 
Marshaling the evidence entails marshaling or listing all the evidence supporting 
the finding that is challenged. See Tingey v. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,11 
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(Utah 1999); Benvenuto. 372 Utah Adv. Rep. At 4; State v. ex rel T.J.. 945 P.2d 158. 
164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997): In re Estate of Hamilton. 869 P.2d 971. 977 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Weinstein has not done so. 
STANDARD: The standard of review is that a trial court's findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 
(Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932.937 (Utah 1998); Grossen v. 
DeWitU 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 3132 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
The clearly erroneous standard has been applied to what a reasonable person 
would have done in specific circumstances. See Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty 
WestPev., Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273. 1279 (Utah 1998). The matter under review is a review 
of reasonableness. It has been applied to whether a breach of contract is material. See 
Coalville City v. Lundgrem 930 P.2d 1206. 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The matter 
under review is a review of contract provisions. 
To successfully challenge findings of fact, an appellant must prove they are clearly 
erroneous, i.e. against the clear weight of the evidence. 
ISSUE 1(b). Weinstein then urges that the district court improperly interposed 
an implied covenant of "good faith and fair dealing" but fails to indicate whether this is 
an improper conclusion of law, which requires a different standard of review. One can 
only surmise that Weinstein suggests that the trial court misapplied a principle of law 
because he uses these words repeatedly. 
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STANDARD: The standard of review is again a clearly erroneous standard. 
This Court has consistently held that a determination of the application of "good faith 
and fair dealing" is a matter for the trier of fact and is not a conclusion of law. 
"Whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual 
issue, generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law." Cook v. 
Zions First Natl Bank 919 P.2d 56. 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
See Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App 36 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). Good faith and 
fair dealing are fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a breach of good faith 
and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally inappropriate as a matter of law. See 
Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah App. 1993), wherein the 
court states such determination is a "factual issue to be determined by [the factfinder] 
after consideration of all attendant circumstances and evidence." American Concept Ins. 
Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271,273 (Utah App. 1988); accord Commercial Security? Bank 
v. Hodson, 15 Utah 2d 388. 393 P.2d 482 (1964).. 
The only other possible standard would be a mixed one of reviewing the "measure 
of discretion" given to the trial court. This standard is set forth in State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d at 936-39. When a legal rule is to be applied to a given set of facts, or in other 
words when the trial court must determine "whether a given set of facts comes within the 
reach of a given rule of law," the trial court is given a de facto grant of discretion. Id. At 
936-37. Although legal questions are reviewed for correctness, appellate courts may still 
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grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact situation. See 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d at 1244. Because of the fact sensitive nature of the good faith 
requirement, this alternate standard does not apply. 
ISSUE 1(c). Weinstein then urges that the district court rewrote a contract 
between the parties to contain a term that "permission cannot be unreasonably withheld." 
This issue appears to suggest that such determination is an abuse of discretion. 
STANDARD: The standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard, 
which requires the appellate court to find that there is "no reasonable basis for the 
decision." See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck. 860 P.2d 937. 938 (Utah 1993). A trial 
judge's determination will be reversed if the ruling "is so unreasonable that it can be 
classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." Kunzler v. O 'Dell 
855 P.2d 270. 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468. 476 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
ISSUE 11(a). Weinstein next suggests that the district court failed to grant a 
mandatory injunction. This determination is clearly within the discretionary power of the 
trial court. 
STANDARD: The standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard set 
forth above. This standard has specifically been applied to whether a trial court properly 
granted or denied injunctive relief. See Aquagenlnt'l Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 
411, 412 (Utah 1998); Miller v. Martineau & Co.. 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 34. 36 (Utah Ct. 
9 
App. 1999V 
ISSUE 11(b). Weinstein then complains that the trial court denied relief for a 
"lack of perceived damages." This determination is one of discretion with the trial court. 
STANDARD: The standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard set 
forth above and specifically applied to a denial of injunctive relief. 
ISSUE III. Weinstein next complains that the trial court did not give him an 
opportunity to introduce evidence of actual damages. There is no reference whatsoever 
in the record to his ever attempting to do so, nor does he suggest that he attempted to 
introduce such evidence. This is not an issue for appeal. 
ISSUE IV. Weinstein finally urges that the Appellate Court review the trial 
court's failure to direct reimbursement of his legal fees and expenses. His argument, at 
Point III indicates that he finds it to be an abuse of discretion. 
STANDARD: The standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard set 
forth above. With regard to this standard, the appellant must show the trial court 
exceeded the measure of discretion allotted by showing no reasonable basis for the 
decision. 
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
At no stage of the proceedings did Weinstein's trial counsel preserve any of the 
issues raised on appeal for the first time for appellate review. There were no objections 
to actions taken by the trial court. There were no requests to introduce evidence of 
damages. No post trial motions were filed. Appellant raises all issues for Ihe first time 
on appeal. The rationale for preservation is that the trial court, in fairness, ought to have 
a chance to correct its own errors. See State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 122L 1225-26, 1227 
(Utah 1998); In re Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015. 1018 (Utah Ct. App.1997) 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS 
Appellant Weinstein fails to set forth any grounds for the appeal. The only point 
he consistently returns to in his brief is that the CC&Rs require that he give his 
permission before the Popiels can build a fence on their property. He has repeatedly 
refused to give his permission. He states that it is his legal and absolute right to withhold 
it, even to the point of arbitrary refusal. The trial court respectfully disagrees. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Popiels stand firmly on the facts of the case set forth by the district court in its 
ruling. Because Weinstein has failed to marshal the evidence, the appellate court must 
accept the facts as set forth by the trial court. Neighbor Weinstein argues with the findings 
of fact throughout his brief and attempts to repeatedly return to the record to selectively 
introduce facts favorable to him, not advising the appellate court that many of his selections 
were controverted, i.e. urging that another neighbor objected to the fence and that the 
property owners built their fence maliciously and with actual knowledge of a requirement 
to obtain his permission, which points of view the trial court specifically controverts. The 
appellate court should disregard pages 8-15 of appellant's brief for this reason and apply the 
trial court's findings of fact, which are as follow. 
"The parties live in the Ranch Place subdivision. Their properties adjoin each other, 
in part. All properties and homeowners in Ranch Place are subject to Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions ("CC&Rs") which were in place when both parties bought their respective 
properties, and at all times relevant to the dispute. Fencing of Ranch Place properties is 
subject to specific conditions in the CC&Rs. Until 2000, neither property was fenced. 
Many properties in Ranch Place are fenced and many of the existing fences exceed the four 
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foot height restriction. Few fences in the parties' immediate neighborhood are fenced, and 
before the Popiels fenced their property, approximately seven adjacent properties were 
unfenced and constituted de facto common ground between and around the houses. The 
Popiels' fence complies with neighborhood standards, was approved by the Homeowners' 
Association ("HOA"), but it exceeds the height restriction by approximately three to nine 
inches. The height is, however, consistent with the height of other fences in the subdivision. 
The Popiels fenced their property for at least two reasons: to restrain and protect their 
surviving dog, after one dog was killed by an automobile, and to prevent Mr. Weinstein 
from using their property to run his dog. Popiels did not obtain Mr. Weinstein's permission 
before they erected a fence that ran just inside their property line, where it adjoins Mr. 
Weinstein's property. The CC&Rs require that such permission be obtained. Mr. Weinstein 
withheld his permission for at least two reasons: first, he relied on the use of Popiels' 
property to extend his relatively small backyard to provide exercise and play for his dog, and 
he also cherished the "common" ground which he believes benefitted not just him, but all 
adjoining property owners. Mr. Weinstein claims he would never have bought his property 
if he had believed his neighbors could erect an adjoining fence over his objections. Two 
other property adjoining property owners have given permission for the fence. There is a 
dispute whether Martins gave permission, but they have since sold their property, and they 
have never filed a formal complaint or joined this lawsuit. The Popiels did receive pre-
approval for the fence from the HOA, but the approval letter failed to refer to the need to 
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obtain permission from neighbors, and Mr. Weinstein had no notice of the construction until 
after it was accomplished. 
When Mr. Weinstein pursued his objection with the HOA, after construction was 
complete, the HOA agreed that the approval letter lacked reference to the need for 
permission, but the officers of the HOA indicated that they believed the approval 
requirement was a courtesy provision, and not an absolute requirement. Because Mr. 
Weinstein persevered with his objections, the HOA then conducted a variance procedure to 
determine if the Association members were willing to grant a variance for the lack of 
permission. At the time of the meeting, Mr. Weinstein had never objected to the excessive 
height of the fence, and the height was not at issue. At the HOA meeting, homeowners in 
attendance voted 64 to zero in favor of the variance. That is not the required absolute 
majority of all homeowners, but unrebutted evidence establishes that when proxies were 
counted, the vote exceeded fifty percent. Neither party presented evidence that proxies are 
not valid with respect to a variance vote." 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Weinstein states in his summary of his argument that the district court interjected an 
implied condition of fair dealings and good faith and accepted a disputed subjective excuse 
and argues that such actions were improper. Mr. Weinstein's arguments are incorrect and 
lack legal foundation. 
He cannot have it both ways. On the one hand he would like to argue that the 
CC&Rs constitute an absolute, unambiguous contract between the parties, which the court 
must enforce with strict rigidity. On the other hand, if one accepts that the court must 
consider the CC&Rs to be a contract, then one cannot disregard the well established 
application of the mandatory implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which adheres 
to all contracts in the State of Utah. The trial court did not "interject" anything improperly 
and is not rewriting the terms of the contract, as neighbor Weinstein repeatedly complains. 
The property owners stand firmly behind the long line of precedent in this 
jurisdiction, which abhors discretionary capriciousness and looks to the common good and 
purpose, course of dealings and conduct of the parties and reasonable expectations. 
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These principles control and guide our courts and are set forth with their 
corresponding authority in the property owners' Argument. Neighbor Weinstein ignores 
Utah's adherence to consideration of the common good and would have the court apply the 
contextual extracts of law from the multiple cases he cites from foreign jurisdictions, such 
as New York, New Jersey, Texas, Colorado, Oklahoma and other states. Weinstein relies 
further on employing unsavory language in his challenge to the trial court's ruling; accusing 
the court of "arriving at the popular position," depicting him as a villain, focusing on the 
"abortive variance vote" of the Home Owners Association and overlooking the "false 
publicity" mis-characterizing him.. 
ARGUMENT 
Where expressly stated, restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and are 
strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property. Robbins v. Finaly, 
645 P.2d 623.627 (Utah 19&2): Parrishv. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419.421.336 P.2d 122.123 
(1959): Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339. 345. 423 P.2d 155. 159 (1967). Generally, 
express restrictive covenants are upheld only "where they are necessary for the protection 
of the business for the benefit of which the covenant was made and no greater restraint is 
imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such protection. Allen v. Rose Park 
Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608. 614. 237 P.2d 823. 826 (1951). 
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Neighbor Weinstein uses language in his brief which suggests that he, himself, 
bargained with property owners Popiel to create the provisions of the CC&Rs. He suggests 
that he is being deprived of the benefit of the bargain, if he cannot now exercise his absolute 
unequivocal contract right to withhold his permission for the property owners to have their 
rather innocuous split rail fence in their back yard. [The fence is of the type which has three 
split log rails, each approximately 9? long; held up by vertical posts at each end.] 
The trial court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion in finding that Weinstein 
unreasonably withheld his permission for the Popiels to build their fence. The Utah 
Supreme Court set forth controlling principles in Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7 (Utah 2000) 
when it stated that "we interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, 
nature and purpose of the contract." See Utah State Med. Ass 'n v. Utah State Employees 
Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1982); Mxow v. Nixon, Inc. v. John New &Assocs., 
Inc.. 641 P. 2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982); adding that "where there is doubt about the 
interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable result will be preferred over a harsh and 
unreasonable one. And an interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be 
adopted only where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no 
other reasonable interpretation to be given it." 
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BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING 
It is well established and longstanding law in the State of Utah that every contract 
is subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
"A covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, 
contractual relationships." St. Benedict's Dev. V. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991). 
The trial court did not interject an implied condition. "Every contract is subject to an 
implied covenant of good faith." ladanza v. Mather, 820 F. Supp. 1371 (10th Cir. 1993). 
Weinstein did not obtain a transcript of the Summary Judgment hearing for the record on 
appeal, as requested by Appellee's motion, because it was in that hearing the argument was 
advanced with regard to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It was not interjected 
after the hearing and it cannot be so argued in the absence of any record.. Nor can there be 
any argument that there was no basis in fact for the trial court's ruling, reviewing the court's 
own findings of fact, which stand as written. 
It is well established that an element of reasonableness must attach to the language 
of the CC&Rs. 
"The purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties should be determined 
by considering the contract language and the course of dealings and conduct 
of the parties." Ibid St. Benedicts 811 P.2d. 194. 199-200 (Utah 1991). 
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The CC&Rs provide that actions such as building a fence are to be evaluated, 
approved and overseen by the Homeowners Association ("HOA"). The property owners 
complied with this provision. The trial court found in its findings that "the officers of the 
HO A indicated that they believed the approval requirement was a courtesy provision and 
not an absolute requirement. " The HOA was convinced that the neighbor had no 
legitimate reason for withholding his approval, such as fence color or type and that the only 
reason for refusing to give permission was that he could no longer run his dog across their 
property (R-0231, 0246). The HOA believed that the purpose of an objection was to call 
to the committee's attention a legitimate problem to be considered by them in granting an 
approval. Weinstein's refusal to grant permission did not further the common good or 
purpose of the restrictive covenants. 
The parties to a contract are deemed to intend that the terms of a contract should be 
construed in a manner which assumes the parties intended that the duties and rights created 
by the contract should be performed and exercised in good faith. This means that "one party 
may not render it difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and then take 
advantage of the non-performance he has caused. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 
1319, 1321 (Utah 1975V See also Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food and 
Drug Ctrs, Inc., 889 P.2d 445. 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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There is no case law known to the Appellees which grants one party an absolute and 
unreasonable right to exercise a discretionary withholding of approval over the other. 
"To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's 
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified 
expectations of the other party." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991) 
"When a party has been granted discretion under a contract, that discretion may not 
be exercised capriciously or in bad faith." Ibid., Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d 445, 456 (Utah 
App. 1994). The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "the purpose of the good 
faith doctrine in contract law is to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties by 
'implying terms in the agreement.'" Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 
F.2d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). Where an express term establishes a right or power to be 
exercised in the sole discretion of one party, in Utah that right or power must be exercised 
consistent with the covenant of good faith. A.I. Transp. v. Imperial Premium Fin., 862 F. 
Supp. 345 00 t h Cir. 1988). 
Neighbor Weinstein has adamantly announced even after-the-fact that "he wouldn't 
have approved [the fence] if asked" (R-0224) and that he "won't give permission because 
they never asked me" (R-0230). The Association believed that he would not give his 
permission was because he used to run his dog on their property (R-0231). 
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"An examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine 
whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a 
party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
the justified expectations of the other party. The purpose, intentions, and 
expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the contract 
language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties." 
Ibid., St Benedicts. 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
Thus it is the parties' agreed common purpose and justified expectations that are 
critical in determining whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been 
breached. A party's expectations can be justified only when grounded in the language of 
the contract, the course of dealing between the parties, and/or the parties' conduct. In the 
instant case particularly, one must consider the role of the Homeowners Association, 
Architectural Committee and the Officers, who are called upon to determine the common 
purpose and good of the Association and its members. 
"...courts endeavor to construe contracts so as not to grant one of the parties 
an absolute and arbitrary right...." Resource Management Co. v. Weston 
Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028. 1037 (Utah 1985) See also Beck v. 
Farmer's Ins. Exck. 701 P.2d 795. 797-98 (Utah 1985V 
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The neighbor makes the argument to the appellate court that this matter is similar to 
zoning violations and their interference with property rights. At the same time, and with a 
straight face, he is suggesting that he must be allowed to exercise his absolute discretionary 
right to withhold his permission in order "to protect the residential integrity of the 
neighborhood." The comparison is rather empty. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Weinstein requested only that the trial court order that the fence be torn down and did 
not during litigation or subsequently suggest or introduce any evidence suggesting that he 
suffered damages (R-0121). The trial court awarded him only nominal damages of $1.00. 
The trial court did not award attorneys fees or costs to either party. This determination is 
entirely within the discretion of the trial court and is solidly supported by law. 
The trial court necessarily has broad discretion in determining the amount of a 
reasonable attorney fee and will not be reversed unless the court abuses its discretion. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985. 991 (Utah 1988). In the absence of abuse of 
discretion, the amount of the award by the district court will not be disturbed. 20 Am.Jur. 
2d Costs, section 78 (1965). 
Where nominal damages are allowed, one dollar is the amount generally awarded. 
Snyderville Transportation Co. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980). 
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When both parties could be described as successful and unsuccessful, the net result 
of the litigation leaves no clear successful party to award fees to and no clear unsuccessful 
party to assess them against. It is proper, therefore, that each party bear its own attorneys 
fees and costs. See Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, 754 P.2d 940 (Utah 1988). 
This position is well founded at law. The 10th circuit has adopted the test set forth 
in Nadeau v. Helgernoe* 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir 1978) for determining whether a plaintiff is 
prevailing. To meet that test, a plaintiff must show two things: (1) that the lawsuit is 
causally linked to securing the relief obtained, and (2) that the defendant's conduct in 
response to the lawsuit was required by law. See e.g. J&J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 
767 F.2d 1469. 1475 (10th Cir 1985). The U.S. District Court stated in David C v. LeavitU 
900 F. Supp. 1547 (10th Cir. 1995) that this test can be characterized thusly: A party may be 
deemed to have prevailed sufficiently to warrant the award of attorneys' fees under a two 
part "catalyst test." Under this test a plaintiff must have been a "significant catalyst" causing 
a defendant to change position, and the defendant's change in position must have been 
required under law. This test was not satisfied in the instant case. 
The United States Supreme Court set forth the most definitive standard in Farrar v. 
Hobby. 506 U.S. 103. 121 L. Ed. 2d 494, 113 S. Ct. 566. 572 (1992) justifying the trial 
court's denial of attorneys fees, by holding that where a plaintiff recovers only nominal 
damages, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all. The degree of a prevailing party's 
"overall success" determines the reasonableness of an award. 
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The trial court has followed the law in requiring each party to bear its own attorneys 
fees and costs. 
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
This appeal is frivolous and without merit. It has been undertaken without reasonable 
basis of prevailing. If Appellant had researched the law set forth by the Appellee in this 
brief before filing the appeal, it would have been apparent to him that there was no basis. 
The Popiels have been continuously forced to defend themselves from malicious prosecution 
in this matter against a vindictive and malevolent neighbor. They built a fence around their 
yard with the written authorization of their Homeowners Association after submitting a 
written request for approval. The neighbor refused to accept the Association's actions and 
made life unbearable for everyone by constant complaining and threatening. The property 
owners then cooperated with legal counsel for the Association when complaining did not 
let up by obtaining signatures from all their neighbors and going through a formal variance 
procedure to obtain the unanimous approval of all homeowners in a formal vote to authorize 
the fence to remain. Appellant Weinstein refused to accept the will, not only of the board 
and the officers of the Association, but of all of the homeowners. The property owners were 
forced to defend themselves in court when the neighbor sued them to have the fence torn 
down. They prevailed and the trial court allowed the fence to remain. Appellant has again 
refused to accept even the District Court's ruling and has filed this appeal. 
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The appeal is frivolous and intended to do nothing more than harass the property 
owners. The Appellees seek and are entitled to their attorneys fees and costs incurred to 
defend against this appeal pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Weinstein has failed to show that "there is no reasonable basis" for the trial 
court's ruling. The "abuse of discretion" standard requires such a showing. The appeal 
centers upon the application of the covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, which 
Weinstein does not believe should be applied to his situation. If, however, he had 
researched the applicable case law, it would have been readily apparent that there are no 
grounds for the appeal. 
WHEREFORE Appellees Popeil, ask this Honorable Court to deny all relief 
requested by Appellant, find that this is a frivolous appeal, and award thern attorneys fees 
and costs for having to defend this action. Appellees further request Oral Argument if the 
Court deems such to be appropriate. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary and none is attached. All references to the trial court's 
Ruling are to the Ruling and Order attached to Appellant Weinstein's brief. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2& day of February, 2003. 
LAW QEFICE OF THOMAS HOWARD 
Thomas L. Howard 
Attorney for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2& day of February, 2003 I served two true, 
correct and exact copies of the foregoing APPELLEES' BRIEF upon the Appellant by 
placing same in the U.S. Mail, first-class mail, postage pre-paid, addressed as follows: 
George Weinstein 
Appellant Pro Se 
1821 Browning Court 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Thomas L. Howard 
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